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Those of us who study telecommunications are fortunate to live in very
interesting times. The emergence of new network technologies and advances
in our understanding of the economics and politics of regulation have opened
up the policy space in ways never before imagined. As a result, policymakers
have begun to exhibit an unprecedented willingness to experiment with
alternative institutional arrangements, governance structures, and regulatory
paradigms.
I would like to explore the dimensions of the new policy alternatives
being considered, paying particular attention to what the recent debates over
new approaches to regulation and interagency governance have overlooked.
A close examination reveals that, although these debates have reflected a
number of interesting insights, they have yet to incorporate the full
implications of the forces that are transforming the policy environment.

* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Professor Yoo has
emerged as one of the nation’s leading authorities on media and telecommunications law. His
research focuses on how technological change and emerging economic theories are transforming
the regulation of communications. He is also pursuing research on the economics of copyright
as well as a historical project on Presidential control over the administration of the law.
Professor Yoo received an A.B. from Harvard College; M.B.A. from the Anderson School at
UCLA, and J.D. from Northwestern University. Prior to joining the Vanderbilt faculty,
Professor Yoo clerked for the Honorable Anthony M. Kennedy of the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Honorable A. Raymond Randolph of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit. He also practiced with the law firm of Hogan & Hartson in Washington, D.C.
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My remarks will proceed as follows: Part I reviews the wealth of
possible governance structures currently under discussion.
Part II will identify the two forces that I believe are primarily responsible
for much of the new thinking about telecommunications
regulation—specifically the advent of access regulation and the convergence
of communications technologies—and explore how they have placed a
newfound importance on considerations related to dynamic efficiency. This
analysis sheds new light on the dangers associated with the continued
application of old regulatory tools that are designed primarily to promote
static efficiency and fail to pay sufficient attention to dynamic efficiency.
Part III examines how those same forces are revolutionizing the way
telecommunications policy is being implemented. In particular, it explores
how technological convergence and the shift towards access regulation is
undercutting the traditional approach to setting regulatory rates. My analysis
suggests that the same forces that are transforming the ends of
telecommunications policy are exerting a fundamental transformation on the
means employed as well.
Part IV looks beyond the current discussions to a future in which
competing network platforms serve as complements rather than substitutes for
one another and offers some initial thoughts about the regulatory changes that
might be required.
I. AN UNPRECEDENTED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
In recent years, policymakers have evinced a greater willingness to
experiment with alternative governance structures than has ever been seen
before. One can easily identify at least six areas in which policymakers are
actively reconsidering their basic substantive and institutional approach to
regulation. A brief review of these proposals reveals just how much more
wide open the policy space has become.
First, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recently attempted to offer a clearer
delineation of the types of merger each agency would be responsible for
reviewing for compliance with the antitrust laws. These two agencies have
historically divided merger clearance responsibility on a case-by-case basis.
This process has at times embroiled the two agencies in protracted turf battles,
which in turn has created delays that increased the pressure placed on both the
regulators and the merging parties. As a result, the American Bar Association
and other professional organizations have long called upon the agencies to
simplify the manner in which responsibility for merger clearances was
assigned.
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The DOJ and the FTC jointly offered just such a proposal last year. The
plan advanced by both agencies would circumvent bureaucratic infighting
over particular mergers by dividing regulatory oversight responsibility on an
industry-by-industry basis.1 The effort collapsed in the face of the opposition
of Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ernest Hollings, who objected to
the decision to allocate responsibility to review media-related mergers to the
DOJ.2 Now that control of the Senate has changed hands, it remains to be
seen whether a similar proposal will resurface.
Second, policymakers have begun to debate whether to impose greater
restrictions on the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC’s) role in
scrutinizing mergers in the communications industry. Unlike mergers in other
industries, which are generally reviewed only by either the DOJ or the FTC,
communications-related mergers must also go through an additional level of
review by the FCC.3 The dual nature of the review increases the costs of such
mergers and extends the time needed to clear these mergers, which can be
catastrophic in technologically dynamic industries.
In addition, the substantive principles applied by the FCC differ widely
from those applied under conventional antitrust review. Under the approach
taken by the DOJ and the FTC, the burden rests on the government to prove
that the merger would harm competition. In addition, those agencies have
jointly issued Merger Guidelines that offer a relatively clear description of
how the competitive effects of mergers will be assessed.4 FCC review, in
contrast, is governed by the more amorphous “public interest” standard.5 The
FCC has offered relatively little advance guidance about what it believes the
public interest standard requires. Over time, some details have become
apparent. It is clear, for example, that the FCC places the burden of proof on
the merging parties to show that the merger would affirmatively enhance
competition. The effect is to raise a presumption against mergers, which in
turn forecloses mergers whose competitive effects are either neutral or

1. See Caroline E. Mayer, Justice, FTC Split Duties on Antitrust, WASH. POST, Mar.
6, 2002, at E1.
2. See Yochi J. Dreazen & John R. Wilke, Justice Department, FTC Deal Dividing
Merger Reviews Collapses, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2002, at B6.
3. See generally Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A
Comparative Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 29 (offering a comprehensive review and critique of the differences between FCC and
Justice Department merger review).
4. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(rev. Apr. 8, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm; U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (issued June 14, 1984), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm.
5. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2000).
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ambiguous. In addition, the FCC has made clear that it will block mergers
based on far more speculative harms to potential competition than would be
allowed under current antitrust law.
The FCC’s merger clearance process has also raised substantial
procedural and process-oriented concerns. Specifically, the FCC has been
able to use its role in clearing mergers to impose conditions on the merging
parties. This has had the effect of turning merger review into a form of backdoor regulation that does not have to go through the regular process of notice
and comment and may well be immune from judicial review.
Controversy over the manner in which the FCC was exercising its
merger review authority has led Congress periodically to consider legislation
that would either eliminate or severely restrict the FCC’s authority to review
mergers.6 This, in turn, prompted the FCC to publish internal guidelines
cabining its own discretion in an attempt to head off such criticism.7 While
apparently sufficient to quiet congressional concerns, the FCC’s action has
been less than completely effective in speeding up and rationalizing the FCC’s
merger review process.8
Third, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.9
has opened up a fascinating debate over whether anticompetitive conduct
allegedly undertaken by local telephone companies and other regulated
entities should be policed by courts applying antitrust laws or by regulatory

6. See, e.g., FCC Task Force Aims to Speed Telecom Merger Review, NAT’L POST,
Nov. 4, 1999, at C2; Lisa I. Fried, Congressional Critics Blast FCC Role in Mergers,
RECORDER, June 23, 1999, at 3; Doug Halonen, Seven Month Pitch: Bill Would Force FCC to
Expedite Merger Rulings, ELEC. MEDIA, Apr. 19, 1999, at 4; Kalpana Srinivasan, Lawmakers
Seek to Curtail FCC’s Authority in Mergers, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 15, 2000, at D2.
7. See FCC Transaction Team, Proposed Timeline for Consideration of Applications
for Transfers or Assignments of Licenses or Requests for Authorizations Relating to Complex
Mergers (Mar. 1, 2000), at http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/timeline.html; FCC Transaction
Team, Issues Memorandum for March 1, 2000; Transaction Team Public Forum on
Streamlining FCC Review of Applications Relating to Mergers (Mar. 1, 2000), available at
http:// www.fcc.gov/transaction/issuesmemo.doc; Paige Albiniak & Bill McConnell, FCC Spells
Out Merger Deadlines, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 6, 2000, at 20.
8. To cite one example, although the FCC is nominally supposed to complete its
merger review process within six months, it stops the clock while awaiting information from
the parties or for other agencies to act. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher J. Wright to AOLTime Warner Merger Applicants Stopping the Clock Pending FTC Action (Oct. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/aol-tw101100letter.html. As a result, clearance of
the first major merger reviewed under these new procedures still took eleven months. See
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations
by Time Warner, Inc. & America Online, Inc., 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6548 n.1 (2001).
9. 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
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agencies applying their statutory mandates.10 The courts of appeals have split
over the issue, with some favoring the former11 and others favoring the latter.12
Implicit in this debate are difficult questions about institutional capability and
the procedural differences associated with each approach. It is an issue that
will soon be addressed by the Supreme Court.13
Fourth, even when an issue clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the
agencies rather than courts, it still must be determined whether that
jurisdiction should be exercised by federal or state authorities. The original
division of responsibility established by the Communications Act of 193414
gave the FCC authority over all interstate communications, while according
to the states exclusive jurisdiction over purely intrastate matters.15 Enactment
of the Telecommunications Act of 199616 prompted an extended dispute
between federal and state regulators that was ultimately resolved by the
Supreme Court’s recognition that the Act effected a fundamental shift of
power towards the federal government and away from the states.17
A parallel debate arose with respect to cable modem service, prompted
by the attempt by municipal regulatory authorities to impose open access
requirements either as a matter of direct regulation18 or as a condition upon the
transfer of licenses needed to consummate a merger.19 Two courts of appeals
have rejected the cities’ authority to impose such requirements, holding that

10. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on
Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
11. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
2002), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, L.L.P., U.S. , 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth
Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002).
12. See Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v. Verizon Va., Inc., No. 02-1337, 2003 WL 21153305
(4th Cir. May 20, 2003); Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 399-401 (7th Cir.
2000); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 134 (D.D.C. 2002),
motion granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6456 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2003).
13. See Trinko,
U.S. , 123 S. Ct. at 1480 (granting certiorari on this issue).
14. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000)).
15. See 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2000); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
16. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
18, and 47 U.S.C.).
17. See AT&T Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999).
18. See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp.
2d 685, 686-87 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
19. See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001);
AT&T Co. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the regulation of cable modem service fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the FCC.20
More recently, the FCC has wavered in its certainty that such matters are
best governed by federal regulators. For example, in clarifying the basis for
its jurisdiction to regulate cable modem services, the FCC sought comment on
whether it should forbear from displacing all state and municipal regulation.21
The consensus in favor of federal regulatory jurisdiction received another jolt
in the FCC’s Triennial Review proceedings when the FCC decided to give the
states a greater role in determining the scope of the unbundled access
requirements of the 1996 Act.22 The order in this proceeding was finally
released as this symposium contribution was going to press.23 Final resolution
of this issue will have to wait until the courts finish with the judicial
challenges to the FCC’s actions.24
Fifth, policymakers appear to be actively reconsidering the utility of
many of the basic regulatory tools upon which they have relied for more than
a century. The classic approach taken by regulatory authorities with respect
to telecommunications networks has been to impose cost-of-service rate-

20. The courts differed slightly as to the proper rationale for this holding. Compare
City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 877-80 (holding that cable modem service constitutes a
“telecommunications service” that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC), with
MediaOne Group, 257 F.3d at 363-64 (holding that open access would require cable modem
providers to provide “telecommunications facility” in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D)).
Both agreed that regulation of cable modem services fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
FCC.
21. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable & Other
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4848-52, ¶¶ 96-108 (2002). Interestingly, the FCC contradicted
the conclusions of the two Courts of Appeals that had addressed the issue and based its
jurisdiction on the conclusion that cable modems represented an “information service” regulable
by the FCC under its ancillary jurisdiction provided by Title II of the Communications Act. See
id. at 4832, ¶ 59.
22. Most notably, the FCC left it for state Public Utility Commissioners to decide
whether failure to provide unbundled access to local switching would impair the ability of
competing telecommunications carriers to provide the services that they seek to offer as
required by 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(B). With respect to high-capacity lines used by businesses,
the FCC entered a presumptive finding of no impairment and gave the PUCs ninety days to
rebut that national finding. With respect to mass market (i.e., small business and residential)
lines, the FCC entered no presumption and gave the PUCs nine months to determine whether
economic and operational impairment exists in any particular market. Attachment to Triennial
Review Press Release (FCC Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-231344A2.pdf.
23. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16978 (Aug. 21, 2003).
24. See Jeremy Pelofsky, Phone Carriers Petition Appeals Court to Drop NetworkSharing Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at D3.
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making. This approach requires carriers to file tariffs with regulatory
agencies. Once the authorities approve the tariff, the carriers must make their
services available according to the terms of the tariff to all comers on a
nondiscriminatory basis.
Over time, the administrative process for submitting and approving
tariffs has proven far too cumbersome to accommodate the more competitive
environments that characterize modern telecommunications. In addition,
carriers have proven quite adept at manipulating the tariff process for strategic
purposes.25 Tariffing also contradicts certain basic principles of consumer
protection by sanctioning the displacement of any terms inconsistent with the
tariff to which the parties may have agreed, even when the carrier
intentionally misrepresents its rate and the customer relies upon the
misrepresentation.26
As a result, policymakers have increasingly moved away from tariffs
towards more flexible agreements negotiated on a customer-by-customer
basis.27 Even more fundamentally, regulators have increasingly begun to
abandon classic rate regulation in favor of new approach known as “access
regulation.”28 Rather than focusing on the rates that carriers charge end users
for outputs, access regulation focuses on the terms and conditions under which
competitors can purchase the right to use inputs.
Sixth, the growing convergence of telecommunications technologies has
strengthened the arguments in favor of relying on markets as a governance

25. See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation:
United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 328, 344-47 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. &
Lawrence J. White eds., 2d ed. 1994).
26. See AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1998). For
insightful discussions of the so-called “filed rate doctrine,” see Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed
Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement in the Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003), at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=326701, as well as the contributions of Professors
Rossi and Weiser to this Symposium.
27. See 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2000); Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate,
Interexchange Marketplace, 11 F.C.C.R. 20730 (1996), clarified, 12 F.C.C.R. 20787 (1997),
aff’d sub nom. MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Prior to the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC’s attempts to detariff long distance
rates were repeatedly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co.,
512 U.S. 218 (1994); AT&T Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
28. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 889-90, 960-70, 980-87, 1002-18 (2003)
(tracing the emergence of access regulation in local telephony, pole attachments, and broadband
networks). Indeed, the shift towards access regulation appears to span all regulated industries.
See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57, 1364-83 (1998).
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mechanism. It is towards the confluence of and interaction between these last
two developments that I would like to address the balance of my remarks.
II. ACCESS REGULATION, CONVERGENCE, AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY
It seems to me that the last two transformations that I have
identified—the shift towards access regulation and the emergence of
technological convergence—together have far greater implications for
telecommunications policy than is generally appreciated. In particular, too
little attention has been paid to the new emphasis that these two
transformations have placed on considerations of dynamic efficiency.29
Before convergence, each mode of communication was available
through only one means of transmission, and each means of transmission was
considered a natural monopoly. The impossibility of sustainable competition
from alternative facilities understandably led policymakers to direct their
efforts towards allocating the existing facilities in the most efficient manner
possible and to pay little attention to the impact that their regulatory decisions
had on the incentives to invest in alternative network capacity. In other
words, they focused on static efficiency, which adopts an ex post perspective
that takes the existing distribution of goods as given, and ignores dynamic
efficiency, which evaluates optimality on an ex ante basis and asks the
logically prior question of which goods should be produced in the first place.
Ignoring dynamic efficiency was reasonable when the underlying technologies
remained natural monopolies and any attempt to foster competition would
inevitably prove futile. It is less defensible in an era of technological
convergence, in which the deployment of alternative network facilities
represents a critical policy objective.
The tension between static and dynamic efficiency is well illustrated by
the conundrum posed by access requirements. Under the conventional
approach to competition policy, access requirements represent something of
an anomaly. The fundamental problem posed in most access-related situations
is monopoly control of a bottleneck facility. Under such circumstances, the
most appropriate long-term solution is to break up control of the bottleneck
either by forcing the existing player to divest part of its holdings or by
cultivating the emergence of new entrants who will compete directly with the

29. The discussion that follows draws on the more extensive discussion of these issues
presented in Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New
Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 243-47, 268-69 (2002). See also Spulber & Yoo, supra note
28, at 897-98, 931-32 & n.160, 975-76, 992, 996, 1020 (applying this analysis to compelled
access to local telephone, utility pole, and broadband networks).
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bottleneck facility. Access remedies, in contrast, simply force bottleneck
owners to share their monopolies without breaking them up.
Such a result might be justified when an industry is truly a natural
monopoly and there is no viable prospect that any degree of competition
would be sustainable. The propriety of access remedies changes radically
after the emergence of alternative network facilities becomes technologically
and economically feasible. When sustainable competition is possible, access
regimes harm dynamic efficiency in two distinct ways. First, it is now well
recognized that resources are most likely to receive the appropriate level of
conservation and investment if they are protected by well-defined property
rights.30 Since any benefits gained from investments in capital or research
must be shared with competitors, forcing a monopolist to share its resources
reduces incentives to improve their facilities and pursue technological
innovation.
Second, compelling access to an input also discourages investment by
competitors by rescuing firms that need the input from having to invest in
alternative sources of supply. In other words, forcing carriers to share their
networks cuts off those who would like to construct alternative network
facilities from their natural strategic partners. Access can thus preempt the
emergence of a viable alternative to the bottleneck facility that represents the
best long-run solution to the bottleneck problem. Quite the contrary, access
remedies can have the perverse effect of cementing the existing monopoly into
place.
This is particularly true in technologically dynamic industries, in which
the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to compete
directly with the bottleneck are the highest. The inevitable lag in adjusting
regulation also raises the risk that regulations, such as access, that protect
incumbents from new entry will continue to exist long after the justifications
for enacting the regulation have long disappeared.31
A growing body of empirical work suggests that the provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 compelling incumbent local exchange
carriers (ILECs) to provide competitors with access to elements of their
networks on an unbundled basis32 have stifled investment in local telephone
networks in precisely this manner. Not only has it deterred incumbents from

30. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
354-59 (1967); Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
31. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 286-87 (1982); 2
ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 127 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Natural
Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 611-15 (1969).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
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investing in their networks, it has also rescued new entrants from having to
invest in their own facilities.33
Put in terms of the ongoing debate about open access that is taking place
in the cable broadband proceedings, the real problem is not that consumers
lack sufficient choice in terms of internet service providers (ISPs). Indeed,
most can reach their desired web portal simply by clicking through to another
address or by resetting their default home page to another website. The real
problem is the lack of choice in last-mile broadband providers. Most
households can only choose between their local cable operator and local
telephone company. This underlying problem will remain regardless of
whether consumers can choose among multiple ISPs or not. Mandating open
access would thus amount to little more than simply rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titannic.
The best long-run solution would be to stimulate the build-out of
alternative broadband platforms. Indeed, satellite broadband, fixed wireless
technologies, and third-generation mobile wireless devices (3G) each hold
considerable promise to diversify our broadband choices. The problem is that
deployment of each these technologies will require significant capital
investments. The logical strategic partners to help finance such investments
are those ISPs and other content providers who are unable to obtain the access
to existing broadband networks. Mandating such access would obviate their
need to undertake such risks. While the elimination of the need to make such
investments would doubtlessly be beneficial to those ISPs, it is far from clear
how consumers would benefit from such an outcome. It may seem
counterintuitive, but the best way to maximize choice in the long run may well
be to limit the number of choices in the short run. Such is the nature of the
interrelationship between dynamic and static efficiency.
The implications of this line of reasoning are clear. Technological
convergence appears to have eviscerated the factual preconditions needed to
justify imposing access requirements. Although compelling access may make
sense when an input is not available from any other source, it makes no sense
in a convergent world in which alternative sources of supply are feasible. The
fact that generating alterative sources of supply may be costly and may take
a long time does not change the analysis. If the choice is between “some time
in the far future” and “never,” the former is still the better alternative.

33. See Augustin J. Ros & Karl McDermott, Are Residential Local Exchange Prices
Too Low?, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A. Crew ed.,
2000); James Zolnierek et al., An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in Local Telephone
Markets, 19 J. REG. ECON. 143 (2001); Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies
Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment? (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=387421.
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The inherent tension between access requirements and dynamic
efficiency represents one of the central weaknesses of any access-oriented
regulatory regime. If access prices are set too low, the imposition of an
access regime will forestall the emergence of platform competition, as every
potential entrant will find it more profitable to borrow parts of the
incumbent’s network rather than to build its own. It will also discourage the
incumbent from making any investments in its network. The net result is an
inevitable degradation of our communications infrastructure. Setting access
prices too high, on the other hand, will render access remedies completely
useless. Regulators implementing access regimes find themselves caught in
a somewhat intractable position.34
Perhaps the greatest irony is that practical considerations may render the
debates about the relative policy or impolicy of access regimes largely moot.
Because the owner of the input has no real motivation to provide access to its
competitors, it is common for interconnection agreements to become bogged
down in incessant arguments about the reasonableness of the terms and
conditions of access. It is thus arguable that access is destined to prove
ineffectual as a remedy regardless of whether access is compelled or not.35
The FCC’s history with policing access regimes provides ample reason to
suspect that the debates about access may ultimately prove to be much ado
about nothing.36
III. CONVERGENCE AND REGULATORY PRICING
In addition to effect that the emergence of access regulation and
technological convergence has had on the goals of telecommunications policy,
federal and state regulators have failed to appreciate the full implications that

34. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this inherent tension in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 511-13 (2002). The Court nonetheless attempted
to avoid its strictures by suggesting that the lag inherent in any regulatory system would provide
sufficient incentive to foster investment. The existence of supposedly countervailing distortions
will of course give rise to additional efficiency losses.
35. See Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in
Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 125253, 1256-58, 1260-61, 1263, 1267, 1283-84 (1999).
36. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Competition, Rate Deregulation, and the Commission’s Policies Relating to the Provision of
Cable Television Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962, 5048, ¶ 177 (1990); Donna N. Lampert, Cable
Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 245 (1992); Glen O.
Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1222-23 (2002).
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these two developments have for the means employed to achieve those goals.37
For more than a century, the traditional approach has been to base rates on
some measure of cost. The reasons for adopting this approach are perhaps
best stated by Justice Brandeis’s classic concurrence in Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission38 from which
the Court has drawn guidance in later years.39
Justice Brandeis implicitly recognized that the most accurate
methodology for setting rates would be the prices charged for comparable
goods when sold in competitive markets. Understanding that value is best
determined by the market reflects the insights of what has become known as
the “marginalist revolution” that undergirded the rise of neoclassical
economics in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century.40 Prior to that time,
value was regarded as an intrinsic concept established by the cost of the inputs
required to produce the good. The marginalist revolution recast value as a
relativistic concept determined by the interaction between supply and demand.
The advent of neoclassical economics underscored the importance of
using market-based rather than cost-based indicia when assessing the value of
any good. Justice Brandeis recognized that determining market value is a
relatively simple matter when the good in question (or some good comparable
to it) is sold into an unregulated market. In such a case, the market value is
simply the market price. If market prices are unavailable, a market-based
assessment can also be derived through the capitalization of earnings.
The problem was that neither approach was practicable in the case of
natural monopolies. External, unregulated markets did not exist for utilities
or the goods that they produce, “since utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are
not commonly bought and sold in the market.”41 Justice Brandeis further
noted that calculating value by capitalizing the utility’s earnings necessarily
embroiled regulatory authorities in a “vicious circle.”42 As the Court later

37. The discussion that follows extends the discussion advanced in Spulber & Yoo,
supra note 28, at 907-12.
38. 262 U.S. 276, 289-312 (1923) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring in the
judgment).
39. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 482-85 (2002); Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 & n.5 (1989); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603-07 (1942) (Black, J., concurring).
40. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 305, 308-15 (1993); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from
the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 243-46 (1984).
41. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276,
292 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
42. Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 292; accord St. Louis & O’Fallon Ry. Co. v. United
States, 279 U.S. 461, 505 n.23 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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noted, “[t]he heart of the matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon
‘fair value’ when the value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under
whatever rates may be anticipated”; the result is that fair value becomes “the
end product of the process of rate-making not the starting point.”43
In the absence of some market-determined basis for setting rates, Justice
Brandeis concluded that the only available alternative was to base rates on
some measure of cost.44 Justice Brandeis recognized that replacement cost
would likely represent the best evidence of present value, since it would
provide a better reflection of technological improvements and obsolescence.45
In the end, however, pragmatic considerations led Justice Brandeis to advocate
relying on historical cost. Determining replacement cost was an inherently
speculative endeavor fraught with unnecessary uncertainty.46 In comparison,
relying on historic cost allowed for less variable and subjective determinations
of value.47
What has largely gone unnoticed is how technological convergence and
the emergence of access regulation have undercut the traditional justifications
for basing regulated rates on cost-based measures. The emergence of
alterative network platforms (such as wireless telephone networks; wireline
broadband networks, such as digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable modem
systems; and satellite distribution of television, telephony, and broadband)
now provides a wealth of unregulated markets in which comparable goods are
bought and sold in arms-length transactions. As a result, the emergence of
platform competition has now made external benchmarks widely available and
ready to serve as market-based determinants for regulatory prices.
The shift towards access regulation facilitates basing rates on market
prices even more. The shift from regulating outputs to regulating inputs
mitigates the inherent circularity of basing access rates on market prices.
Instead, the cost of an input becomes only one of many determinants of the
final good’s total value. For example, if an input represents only five percent
of the overall cost, the price charged for that input will exert only a relatively
small influence on the value of the final good. In addition, inputs may have
other uses in unregulated markets that do not exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics. If that is the case, it should be possible to establish the value
of an input through an external, market benchmark that does not depend upon
the particular rate being set.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 292 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 300.
See id. at 293-302.
See id. at 308-10.
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To cite one example, consider how the advent of wireless telephony
makes it possible to base the rates for terminating calls by incumbent wireline
carriers upon market prices. Unlike interconnection agreements involving
wireline carriers, interconnection between wireless carriers is currently
unregulated.48 As a result, the terms of wireless-to-wireless interconnection
are determined through arms-length negotiations that can provide precisely the
type of external benchmark needed to determine the market value of
termination of calls by wireline carriers.
Indeed, basing access rates on market prices may represent more than
good economic policy. The fact that access to wireline networks almost
invariably requires the network owner to permit competitors to place
equipment on its property indicates that access regimes constitute per se
physical takings for which market-based compensation must be paid.49
IV. BEYOND CONVERGENCE: FROM SUBSTITUTION TO COMPLEMENTARITY
It is thus becoming increasingly clear that technological convergence and
the shift towards access regulation is undermining the primary justifications
for much of existing telecommunications policy. Gone are the days in which
each communications technology could be regarded as occupying a separate
regulatory silo. The impending shift of all networks to packet-switched
technologies promises to complete the collapse of any remaining attempt to
base regulation on differences in the means of transmission.50 Once all
communications are reduced to bits and bytes, all media will constitute
substitutes for one another, and attempts to segment markets based on the
means of conveyance will become increasingly problematic.
Unfortunately, the underlying regulatory regime has not yet fully
accommodated these changes. Instead, the basic regulatory structure
continues to treat each transmission medium as if it were a universe unto
itself. Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was trumpeted as a way
to end this regulatory balkanization, it left the basic technology-specific
regime erected by the Communications Act of 1934 intact.
Most interestingly of all, regarding various network technologies as
substitutes for one another may represent nothing more than a transitional step
in the logic of convergence. Although each technology now serves as a
substitute for one another, they each possess different technological
characteristics that affect the purposes for which each is best suited. One can

48. See Interconnection and Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio
Servs., 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000).
49. See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 28, at 933-59, 976-80, 998-1001, 1021-23.
50. See Yoo, supra note 29, at 285-90.
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envision a day in which every communication will not necessarily take place
over more than one medium. The various packets comprising a single piece
of communication might travel through both wireline and wireless media
simultaneously and be reassembled only after arriving at its destination.
Even more radically, communications systems could be designed so as
to take advantage of the different technological characteristics of the various
media. Consider, for example, the usage patterns of the typical person
browsing the World Wide Web. Such a person would need a fairly large
amount of bandwidth to download the requested webpages. The amount of
information needed to be transmitted along the return path would be relatively
small, consisting of nothing more than a URL. Currently, most broadband
technologies use the same transmission technology for downloading and
uploading, but there is nothing inevitable about such an arrangement. One can
easily imagine a system that combines high-bandwidth technologies for
downloading with low-bandwidth technologies for uploading. In addition, it
is conceivable that different types of content might be segregated to different
media, based on overall demand. One can thus also envision a day in which
certain general-interest websites are broadcast via wireless technologies, while
content that commands only small audiences is narrowcast through wireline
technologies.
This suggests that the ultimate destiny is that the various
communications platforms will serve as complements, rather than substitutes.
Acknowledging this possibility poses regulatory problems that are radically
different from those posed previously. It counsels in favor of moving past the
conventional line of business restrictions which limit any entity from owning
more than one network technology. It also raises the possibility that new
types of regulation that would allow sharing of each network might have to
be created.
I find the prospect of such new regulatory challenges to be quite
exciting. Whichever direction the debate ultimately turns, I have little doubt
that the Quello Center and this Symposium will be at its forefront.

